Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility
Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Thu, 27 September 2007 17:49 UTC
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Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2007 10:45:26 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility
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At Thu, 27 Sep 2007 09:49:35 -0700, Mike wrote: > > Remember that the signature over > > the client's certificate and CertificateVerify is for the > > client's benefit, not the servers, and vice versa.... > > I thought that the signature over the client's certificate > was to prove to the server that you have the corresponding > private key, and therefore that you are the entity named in > the certificate (and deserve access to private information > about that entity). Yes, I agree with this. My point is that the enforcement of the client's identity *must* happen by the server. There is nothing the client can do to force the server to enforce a strong policy for client auth. Consider the following case: - SHA-1 has been broken. - I have a classic RSA certificate signed with RSA-SHA-256. - The server isn't under my control and foolishly accepts SHA-1. No matter how I configure my client, an attacker can impersonate me and sign with SHA-1 and the server will accept it. -Ekr _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Bodo Moeller
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Mike
- Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Axel.Heider
- Re: Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 interoperating Mike
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Russ Housley
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen