[TLS] RFC8446 Fig3

Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> Fri, 03 May 2019 00:30 UTC

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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 20:30:04 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] RFC8446 Fig3
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Hi,

This might have already been mentioned on the list, but unless I
misinterpreter something it seems to me that the second handshake of figure
3 is missing psk_key_exchange_modes extension.

Yours,
Daniel

 Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first handshake
   establishes a PSK and the second handshake uses it:

          Client                                               Server

   Initial Handshake:
          ClientHello
          + key_share               -------->
                                                          ServerHello
                                                          + key_share
                                                {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                {CertificateRequest*}
                                                       {Certificate*}
                                                 {CertificateVerify*}
                                                           {Finished}
                                    <--------     [Application Data*]
          {Certificate*}
          {CertificateVerify*}
          {Finished}                -------->
                                    <--------      [NewSessionTicket]
          [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]


   Subsequent Handshake:
          ClientHello
          + key_share*
          + pre_shared_key          -------->
                                                          ServerHello
                                                     + pre_shared_key
                                                         + key_share*
                                                {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                           {Finished}
                                    <--------     [Application Data*]
          {Finished}                -------->
          [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]

               Figure 3: Message Flow for Resumption and PSK