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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

takamichi saito <saito@cs.meiji.ac.jp> Fri, 02 October 2015 13:08 UTC

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From: takamichi saito <saito@cs.meiji.ac.jp>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed
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> 
> Do we know how many protocols currently suffer from CRIME?
> 
> 
> Maybe a best practice could be suggested by UTA for the implementation of TLS in software, to disable compression if vulnerable.  And for the others, to implement a way to enable/disable compression in case one day a vulnerability is found.

I agree.

Again,

1) We know CRIME threat, but it can not be risk for everyone.
e.g., CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.6 (LOW)

2) If we need to have comp/decomp in an application layer, 
 clients such like browser need their own comp/decomp codes.

3) If there is no comp in tls1.3, some people may continue to use tls1.2. 
Which one is safer, "tls1.2" v.s. "tls1.3 with comp/decomp" ?

That's why we explore the way to keep compression in TLSv1.3.
How about making an option only in server-side?
The spec has the compression but default is off, and also provides the suggestion.


> 
> -- 
> Julien ÉLIE
> 
> « La vraie valeur d'un homme se mesure lorsqu'il a tout perdu. »
> 
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;; takamixhi saito
c2xhYWlidHNvcw

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