Re: [TLS] Deprecating SSLv3

[Matt Caswell <[e-mail]>]

On 10/11/14 23:17, Martin Thomson wrote:
> (UTA on BCC)
> 
> The POODLE attack has been used across the industry to justify disabling SSLv3.
> 
> For some of us, this was just the excuse, but others might need more
> motivation.  A statement from the IETF might help move some people.
> 
> Richard, Alfredo, Adam and I have proposed such a statement:
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-thomson-sslv3-diediedie/


This sentence gave me pause for thought:

"Servers SHOULD accept handshakes from clients that propose SSLv3 or
higher, but MUST NOT negotiate SSLv3"

I found that quite a confusing sentence and had to read it a couple of
times. The "or" suggests that "servers SHOULD accept handshakes from
clients that propose SSLv3 (only)"...and then goes on to contradict itself.

Perhaps something like

"Server SHOULD accept handshakes from clients that use a record layer
version of {03,00} (SSLv3), but MUST NOT negotiate SSLv3"

Matt