Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 28 July 2014 07:41 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C738EFB1969@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 10:40:03 +0300
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LhWzqaQWaZ51O5xSNaN71RQp4rI
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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On Jul 28, 2014, at 7:08 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

> Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
> 
>> I believe that changing the 5-byte record header will cause us trouble. 
>> Passive IDS/IPS devices follow TLS streams to detect certain attacks. They 
>> will cut connections. 
> 
> Is it really up to the TLS WG to break (or at least constrain) our designs
> in order to accomodate broken middleboxes?  They're not going to understand
> any of TLS 1.3 anyway and will need to be updated when it comes along, so why
> keep this legacy header just for them?

It is up to the TLS WG to design something that works on the Internet. And the Internet is full of middleboxes.

When they were updated to tolerate TLS 1.1/1.2, some may have version tolerance for forward versions as long as the first byte in 0x03. In looking for abnormally long or short records or for a malformed stream, they may drop any new TLS 1.3 header that doesn’t look like a TLS header.  That kind of thing made WebSockets far less viable than people hoped.

And these middleboxes are not always updated in a timely manner.

Yoav

Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
[TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti