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Re: [TLS] Fwd: Clarification on interleaving app data and handshake records

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Sun, 06 December 2015 02:34 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: Clarification on interleaving app data and handshake records
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Date: Sun, 06 Dec 2015 02:33:39 +0000
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References: <20151015130040.9F1BB1A2EF@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <2977428.j4DNTR9LXR@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20151016203610.GA5596@roeckx.be> <2348468.lpGyMim7ub@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4B9B3DA@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <CACsn0ckLkgMA2xHphro-a1N3tr+NJAvRV_NvVKP2K-=7zj1OfA@mail.gmail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4B9B509@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>, <CACsn0cmUzez7zttX+F-axEfCo098FWOWyj2UkBuV2Nc+weoSqQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Clarification on interleaving app data and handshake records
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Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> writes:

>miTLS did not claim to be consistent with the RFC. Rather it claimed to be
>secure, and to interoperate with most other implementations in circumstances
>tested. The informal nature of the RFC makes it impossible to carry out
>formal verification against it.

By that argument, you could start accepting SSH messages in the middle of the
TLS handshake.  No matter how you colour it, accepting Application Data after
a Client Hello is wrong.  Is there any random, non-formally-verified
implementation that would do that?

Peter.

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