Re: [TLS] draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 08 August 2016 06:42 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 16:42:10 +1000
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00
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On 8 August 2016 at 16:14, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; wrote:
> In 2, I would imagine the context is probably usually a sequence
> number of some kind.

The draft defines some rules for construction of identifiers that
prevent collisions and the like.

>> Good question.  Errors in encoding or otherwise problems following the
>> rules in the spec should result in a connection-level fatal error.
>> But if the certificate isn't trusted, handling that will be up to the
>> application.
>
> And that should presumably be communicated somehow...

Of course.  See
https://github.com/grittygrease/tls13-post-handshake-auth/issues/18
(feel free to contribute)

> Being able for application to to wait for certificate/cv/finised
> message to be sent, so it can do something special in application
> layer immediately after that.

Sure.  The usual async API guarantees apply here; I don't know that
this needs special treatment in the spec though.  If you disagree, I'm
sure that my coauthors would be happy to take suggestions for
improvements.