Re: [TLS] Implementation survey: Client Certificate URL extension

[[e-mail] (Peter Gutmann)]

Martin Rex <[e-mail]> writes:

>For some firewalls it is sufficient to call a particular URL from the inside
>(with parameters tacked at the end of the URL) in order to open a hole that
>can be entered from the outside.
>
>Generating advertising "clicks" might be another abuse.
>
>Being able to coerce a server to access an arbitrary URL from the inside of
>his network is IMHO a pretty serious security problem.

It's even worse than that, it's turning the server into an attacker-controlled
proxy inside the firewall.  For example I can perform port scans of an
organisation's internal network (and in general attack its internal servers)
using this "feature".  I'll see if I can dig up the postings about this,
although since the discussion was up to 10 years ago I'm not sure if I still
have them.

Peter.
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