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Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18

David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com> Tue, 14 February 2017 15:21 UTC

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From: David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com>
To: Cas Cremers <cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk>
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Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 15:21:50 +0000
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18
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I can see this problem even in the case where the client sends an empty Certificate message during the handshake. If the application does not tell the client what happened, a NewSessionTicket has no way of indicating if it will include client-auth in the next session.

David

            
          




      
    

    

      
    


 




            


        



      
 


      

        
      

          
    
 

    


 

    



    






    

    


    
  
    
  

      
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