[TLS] Proposed Errata for rfc5246

Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com> Wed, 14 November 2018 07:07 UTC

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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:07:13 +0400
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Subject: [TLS] Proposed Errata for rfc5246
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Hi folks,

Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL reported this issue with an implementation:
"
Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent in client
preference order. http://outlook.office365.com  <https://t.co/EOcbx3oZpI>
then chooses the least preferred. every time.
Additional fun fact: I believe it is still standards compliant. RFC5246
says only that it must be sent by the client in preference order. It does
not say the server must respect the order.
"
My suggestion would be something like:
Section 7.4.1.4.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1>;.
current text:

Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving
this extension.
Suggestion:
Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving
this extension. TLS servers MUST respect the order in which the signature
algorithms are sent by the client.