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Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 03 May 2019 20:40 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 03 May 2019 16:39:36 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"
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On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:09 PM Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> Sent from my mobile device
>
> On May 3, 2019, at 3:56 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:31 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> wrote:
>
>> Having said that, given an RFC saying MUST NOT 1.0 and 1.1 which is what
>> the
>> original discussion was about, why not also add MUST NOT MD5 and SHA1 in
>> TLS
>> 1.2 to the text?
>>
>
> This seems like a reasonable proposal.
>
>
> If added, should this just be in the updates section for RFC7525?
>

If done here, the text below would change to MUST and we'd likely need
another WGLC, correct?

   When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
   at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the use
   of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525#ref-CAB-Baseline>] for
   more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
   SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in
   TLS 1.2.


The MUST NOT for SHA-1 is not clearly stated in RFC7525 as far as I can see.


Proposed:

   When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
   at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the use
   of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is the minimum requirement, SHA-1
MUST not be used (see [CAB-Baseline
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525#ref-CAB-Baseline>] for
   more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
   SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in
   TLS 1.2.


MD5 is not discussed in the current version of RFC7525.


Best regards,

Kathleen


> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>> Peter.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen

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