Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 20:55 UTC

Return-Path: <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E758B1A1AFB for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Apr 2015 13:55:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V5dZuSsILHqN for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Apr 2015 13:55:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qg0-x22c.google.com (mail-qg0-x22c.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400d:c04::22c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 241091A1ADD for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Apr 2015 13:55:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qgdy78 with SMTP id y78so18239822qgd.0 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 02 Apr 2015 13:55:35 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=from:to:subject:date:user-agent:cc:references:in-reply-to :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:message-id; bh=AyBQIu2tp6Tm2sRs9G7NEZQDSBHvao9S1jEQhL2HGnI=; b=z6I0aNnW86573B53yn+SUfWFi0Epns0tYhmLrihrO1EUFRlU+//N8kwQczciUynnAx NPpj/k9lYXxwELqgeo/ge7b/oHXoSuM/oM0iR4mgf3benkGKNZlGDciUcEXU/0RhRyso HDnV/KDEj/RW0t31RwiCP+QLfKmAsxRhZg6+9FuyZUNumk3DoWM53v9OptAzu3hVRFqf UoynU7kDQlyw1WD6Bbf+l1fJBYZtMTmQ7d65h/zCWv4hWfCIZaDLggFCxN86offbf64n vzoNtoKTAOwmHBm4DfIDP/LZW++cGdoYd3Puj+sFXHSkz7n8KQGE8vTiuTWvdxfYYgbV ejcA==
X-Received: by 10.140.48.37 with SMTP id n34mr46091206qga.82.1428008135397; Thu, 02 Apr 2015 13:55:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from dave-laptop.localnet (pool-96-245-254-195.phlapa.fios.verizon.net. [96.245.254.195]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id 15sm4247013qhx.31.2015.04.02.13.55.34 (version=TLSv1 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 02 Apr 2015 13:55:34 -0700 (PDT)
From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 16:55:33 -0400
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.5 (Linux/2.6.32-73-generic-pae; KDE/4.4.5; i686; ; )
References: <CAOgPGoBk+E=cNV1ufBaQ0n7=CJQ34zukPixKCEdpmMLBX=Kg_w@mail.gmail.com> <201504021612.35877.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <20150402203412.GK10960@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <20150402203412.GK10960@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201504021655.33958.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/MEM97wGEGtmuMczE9FKAlo5hP0s>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 20:55:38 -0000

On Thursday, April 02, 2015 04:34:14 pm Nico Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 04:12:35PM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote:
> > Fortunately for you, the IETF police are only armed with water
> > balloons made out of an over-engineered rubber that doesn't break on
> > impact, and whilst the IETF jail was agreed to be on an island in the
> 
> [Not to be a total nitpicker or anything, but a water balloon that
>  doesn't break probably hurts a lot more than one that does!]

Nah, very stretchy. Just mildly annoying. But they're too expensive anyway, so it's not like you'll ever see one.

> > middle of nowhere that nobody can really get to, it has never been
> > constructed because they've been arguing over the color to paint the
> > roof for the past 30 years. :p
> 
> Also: it's just a bikeshed.  Amnesty International would have one out in
> a heartbeat.

Also, there's no enforcement. It's basically just an island vacation.

</joke>

> > Serious answer: Just write a separate IoT TLS spec that just contains
> > modifications for whatever isn't viable because you're creating a
> > system not designed to necessarily interoperate with the general
> > Internet. General TLS implementations could implement it as well, or
> > not, depending on needs.
> 
> Sure, that'd be nice (because different manufacturers of IoT devices
> will want to know what to implement as a common denominator).

On Thursday, April 02, 2015 04:34:55 pm Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Indeed:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dice-profile-10

The existing TLS 1.3 spec already says:
"In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the cipher suite [...]"

Maybe just describe the issue in more detail, possibly even cite some profile(s) that could be considered? I don't think there's really any disagreement here on what MTI means in this scenario, but a more thorough explanation that this section is over-ridable for specialized cases wouldn't hurt.


Dave