Re: [TLS] DTLS Handshake race condition

[Michael Tuexen <[e-mail]>]

On Aug 12, 2013, at 12:46 PM, Michael Tuexen <[e-mail]> wrote:

> 
> On Aug 12, 2013, at 12:28 PM, Andy Wilson <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>> Section 4.2.2 states:
>> 
>> The first message each side transmits in each handshake always has
>>   message_seq = 0.  Whenever each new message is generated, the
>>   message_seq value is incremented by one.  Note that in the case of a
>>   rehandshake, this implies that the HelloRequest will have message_seq
>>   = 0 and the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1
>> 
>> This would imply that the client WOULD process the ServerHello with seq==1 as this is a re-handshake.
>> 
>> That's the way i'm reading the spec..
> Me too.
> 
> I think the RFC does cover the race condition I'm referring to...
... I meant "does NOT cover"
> What if the HelloRequest(message_seq=0) is lost and the client sends
> a ClientHello(message_seq=0) on its own (since the local user initates
> a re-handshake). The server accepts the ClientHello and responds with
> a ServerHello(message_seq=1). The client however expects a
> ServerHello(message_seq=0), since it never saw the HelloRequest.
> The HelloRequest is also not retransmitted, since the server considers
> it acked by the ClientHello.
> 
> It is only the collision case I'm considering and I think which is
> not covered by the RFC.
> 
> Best regards
> Michael
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 August 2013 05:08, Michael Tuexen <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 4:19 PM, Andy Wilson <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> After looking over the RFC a bit, wouldn't the client be expecting a HelloVerifyRequest after its ClientHello?
>> I don't think this is necessary, since the client and the server have already
>> a relation. So there is no need to use the cookie mechanism.
>> 
>> However, the question is the same. In your case
>> * The server sends a HelloRequest(MsgSeqNo = 0) and starts the retransmission
>>  timer, since this is a flight.
>> * The HelloRequest is dropped by the network.
>> * The client sends a ClientHello(MsgSeqNo = 0) and start a retransmission timer,
>>  since it is its first flight.
>> * The server sends a HelloVerifyRequest(MsgSeqNo = 1)
>> * The client doesn't process the ServerHello, since it expects the
>>  MsgSeqNo == 0.
>> 
>> Therefore, the server retransmits the flight consisting of the HelloVerifyRequest
>> and the client retransmits the flight containing the ClientHello.
>> So the solution would be that the client accepts
>> * ServerHellos with MsgSeqNo=0 and MsgSeqNo=1.
>> * HelloVerifyRequest with MsgSeqNo=0 and MsgSeqNo=1.
>> 
>> Am I missing something?
>> 
>> Best regards
>> Michael
>>> 
>>> On 12 August 2013 01:17, Michael Tuexen <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> Dear all,
>>> 
>>> while fixing a bug in OpenSSL regarding the DTLS handshake, I thought about
>>> the following scenario (both sides decide to renegotiate at about the same
>>> time):
>>> 
>>> * A DTLS connection is established.
>>> * The server sends a HelloRequest(MsgSeqNo = 0) and starts the retransmission
>>>  timer, since this is a flight.
>>> * The HelloRequest is dropped by the network.
>>> * The client sends a ClientHello(MsgSeqNo = 0) and start a retransmission timer,
>>>  since it is its first flight.
>>> * The server receives the ClientHello, stops the retransmission timer
>>>  and sends the next flight starting with ServerHello(MsgSeqNo = 1)
>>>  since it considers the received ClientHello as an ack for the flight.
>>> * The client doesn't process the ServerHello, since it expects the
>>>  MsgSeqNo == 0.
>>> 
>>> Therefore the client retransmits its ClientHello and the server retransmits
>>> its flight containing the ServerHello. Am I missing something?
>>> 
>>> The problem is that the server has no way to figure out if the received
>>> ClientHello is a reaction to a HelloRequest or not.
>>> The only way out I see is that the client accepts ServerHellos with
>>> MsgSeqNo=0 and MsgSeqNo=1.
>>> I don't think this is covered in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347
>>> 
>>> Any opinions?
>>> 
>>> Best regards
>>> Michael
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>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Regards
>>> 
>>> Andy
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Regards
>> 
>> Andy
>