Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5717)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 03 May 2019 02:12 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 19:11:33 -0700
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5717)
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MT: why do you not think "confirmed"?

-Ekr


On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 6:56 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> Two fixes required, but then I think HFDU is appropriate:
>
> 1. Misspelling of names.
>
> 2. The pre_shared_key extension requires the use of the
> psk_key_exchange_modes extension.
>
> On Fri, May 3, 2019, at 11:04, RFC Errata System wrote:
> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> > "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > You may review the report below and at:
> > http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5717
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > Type: Editorial
> > Reported by: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
> >
> > Section: 2.2.
> >
> > Original Text
> > -------------
> >
> >  Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first handshake
> >    establishes a PSK and the second handshake uses it:
> >
> >           Client                                               Server
> >
> >    Initial Handshake:
> >           ClientHello
> >           + key_share               -------->
> >                                                           ServerHello
> >                                                           + key_share
> >                                                 {EncryptedExtensions}
> >                                                 {CertificateRequest*}
> >                                                        {Certificate*}
> >                                                  {CertificateVerify*}
> >                                                            {Finished}
> >                                     <--------     [Application Data*]
> >           {Certificate*}
> >           {CertificateVerify*}
> >           {Finished}                -------->
> >                                     <--------      [NewSessionTicket]
> >           [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]
> >
> >
> >    Subsequent Handshake:
> >           ClientHello
> >           + key_share*
> >           + pre_shared_key          -------->
> >                                                           ServerHello
> >                                                      + pre_shared_key
> >                                                          + key_share*
> >                                                 {EncryptedExtensions}
> >                                                            {Finished}
> >                                     <--------     [Application Data*]
> >           {Finished}                -------->
> >           [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]
> >
> >                Figure 3: Message Flow for Resumption and PSK
> >
> >
> > Corrected Text
> > --------------
> >
> >  Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first handshake
> >    establishes a PSK and the second handshake uses it:
> >
> >           Client                                               Server
> >
> >    Initial Handshake:
> >           ClientHello
> >           + key_share               -------->
> >                                                           ServerHello
> >                                                           + key_share
> >                                                 {EncryptedExtensions}
> >                                                 {CertificateRequest*}
> >                                                        {Certificate*}
> >                                                  {CertificateVerify*}
> >                                                            {Finished}
> >                                     <--------     [Application Data*]
> >           {Certificate*}
> >           {CertificateVerify*}
> >           {Finished}                -------->
> >                                     <--------      [NewSessionTicket]
> >           [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]
> >
> >
> >    Subsequent Handshake:
> >           ClientHello
> >           + key_share*
> >           + psk_key_exchange_modes
> >           + pre_shared_key          -------->
> >
> >                                                           ServerHello
> >                                                      + pre_shared_key
> >                                                          + key_share*
> >                                                 {EncryptedExtensions}
> >                                                            {Finished}
> >                                     <--------     [Application Data*]
> >           {Finished}                -------->
> >           [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]
> >
> >                Figure 3: Message Flow for Resumption and PSK
> >
> >
> > Notes
> > -----
> > The pre_shared_key requires the pre_share_key extension. As mentioned
> > by Martin Thompson figures do not necessarily guarantee all extensions
> > to be mentioned. However in this case, that would be clarifying to have
> > both extensions mentioned on the figure.
> >
> > Instructions:
> > -------------
> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> > --------------------------------------
> > Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
> Version 1.3
> > Publication Date    : August 2018
> > Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > Source              : Transport Layer Security
> > Area                : Security
> > Stream              : IETF
> > Verifying Party     : IESG
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
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