Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt

[Bodo Moeller <[e-mail]>]

Hanno Böck <[e-mail]>:


> There is currently no such RFC for RC2 or DES. Both are - considering
> current RFCs - perfectly valid ciphers according to RFC 2246.
>

Should we change this to "forbid RC2, DES and RC4" ?


The reasons that this spec talks only about RC4 presumably are that

(1)  only RC4 made it into the TLS 1.2 spec, and
(2)  RC4 currently has much more widespread implementation support (and
practical deployment).

The I-D, however, says "This applies to all TLS versions, and updates
[RFC5246], [RFC4346], and [RFC2246]", so (1) is not a good reason (it would
seem cleaner to say something about the other ciphers too, for the older
protocol versions); and (2) isn't a good reason either (the spec should
stand for itself, not just provide the delta on top of current folklore
knowledge that certain ciphers are out).

So I think a more comprehensive cipher suites MUST NOT / SHOULD NOT
document would be appropriate. (40-bit encryption already is an explicit
MUST NOT for TLS 1.1, but is there any spec that clearly speaks against
using it with TLS 1.0?)

Bodo