Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 06 October 2021 01:59 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2021 18:58:24 -0700
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue
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On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 6:36 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote: > I left a comment, but I don't think that the fix, as it is specifically > proposed, works. > > The general shape of the proposal seems credible. A larger epoch space, > of which we only send the least-significant bits, would seem to address the > concern. But the proposal doesn't specify what to do with the per-record > nonce. > > If we go with a 48-bit epoch we get a few more records (2^32 times as many > I suppose), which is probably enough. And the value would fit in the > per-record nonce. Then you just need a bunch more text that explains how > to encode that nonce. > > A 64-bit epoch doesn't fit in any nonce we currently use. We could > truncate, which would need more analysis (my intuition is that it would be > OK, but I'd like more than a gut feeling). We might use the expanded nonce > options that some (not all) AEAD ciphers have, but that would be a very bad > idea. > This isn't dispositive, but note that TLS 1.3 doesn't include the epoch in its nonce at all. -Ekr > Anyhow, this is all independent of how annoying this will be to > implement. This change is likely to be VERY disruptive to our > implementation. From memory, we have exposed an epoch size through > interfaces that we can't change. Has anyone looked at making the proposed > changes in a serious implementation? > > On Wed, Oct 6, 2021, at 10:14, Christopher Wood wrote: > > Hi folks, > > > > There's one late breaking issue we need to resolve for DTLS 1.3 before > > it proceeds to publication: > > > > https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/249 > > > > Based on discussions with some people involved in the security analysis > > of TLS 1.3, a proposed fix is here: > > > > https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/255 > > > > We'd like to merge this to resolve the issue and continue forward > > progress. To that end, please review the issue and change and indicate > > whether or not it is workable for you. Barring objections, we'll merge > > the PR on Friday, October 15. > > > > Best, > > Chris, for the chairs > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > TLS@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Christopher Wood
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Christopher Wood
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Christopher Wood
- Re: [TLS] Late DLS 1.3 issue Christopher Wood