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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> Tue, 06 May 2014 18:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 May 2014 19:53:54 +0100
From: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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On 06/05/2014 19:48, Watson Ladd wrote:

> I think the number of people who accidentally enabled ADH is an
> order of magnitude more than those who actually wanted it.

+1. I never saw anyone enable ADH, NULL or EXPORT cipher suites
actually on purpose. I have definitely seen people do it by accident.

The mere presence of NULL ciphersuites is dangerous: someone might
actually use them, and that's basically never a good idea.

Take them out; keep them out; don't put them back in.

- -- 
/akr
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