Re: [TLS] Why there should not be a TLS 2.0

Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 09 June 2014 01:24 UTC

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Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 01:24:55 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Why there should not be a TLS 2.0
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On Sun, Jun 08, 2014 at 12:46:53PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:

> Yes, you could define extensions for certificate type and use them: at
> some point SPKI may have been used this way. But as Viktor points out
> GSSAPI dominates this space (unfortunately: anonymous users are hard
> to rope in here).

Kerberos has "kinit --anonymous" (Heimdal CLI syntax).  The client
principal is then (IIRC) WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@REALM.  In this context
the KDC has a client-trusted public key issued by some suitable
X.509 trust anchor (no DANE binding yet).

-- 
	Viktor.