Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00

Hanno Böck <> Tue, 27 January 2015 23:34 UTC

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Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2015 00:33:56 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00
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On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 18:15:22 -0500
Dave Garrett <> wrote:

> Is it at all practical to publish an TLS RFC stating intent to
> deprecate TLS 1.0/1.1 within some fixed timeframe? I think everyone
> would rather phase it out then have to "be the hitman" each time.

I think if the deprecation of SSLv3 shows one thing it is that we need
to start now if we want to deprecate it in several years.

There are products on the market developed as late as 2011 that only
support SSLv3. I think a crucial thing would be to identify and stop
people from deploying TLS 1.0-only solutions today - so we won't have
them tomorrow when we really need to deprecate TLS 1.0.

It's a topic I've been discussing with a number of people lately. Ideas
welcome. I thought about adding something to webpages that will warn
users if they connect with anything != TLS 1.2. That could at least
make people aware if they surf with deprecated technology.

P.S.: +1 from me for the sslv3-die-draft. The sooner this gets out the

Hanno Böck