Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 20:26 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 12:25:36 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBO05oe_xr18uy+-GckNtZitQ9YC8WAtQTsFPQOMR0+FxQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:18 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>; wrote:

> On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>; wrote:
>
>> I wish that were the plan (to upgrade QUIC crypto and eventually make
>> that the new crypto platform).  If I am not mistaken, QUICK crypto is going
>> to be archived, TLS 1.3 will replace the crypto code, and QUIC will remain
>> the transport layer.  So, maybe long-term you folks could do a clean-slate
>> TLS 2.0?  That would would be awesome, IMO.
>>
>
> Have you looked at OPTLS? It provides a clean "core" for TLS, and also
> supports Diffie-Hellman authentication ala Trevor Perrin's protocol Noise.
>
> If TLS 1.3 can shed the cruft, OPTLS seems like a nice direction to go for
> "TLS 2.0
>

TLS 1.3 actually takes quite a bit of stuff from OPTLS (as you can see in
the most
recent OPTLS paper). To a great extent, the differences
are due to explicit WG decisions, specifically the following two decisions;

- Not to have an offline-signed DH credential
- To require signing on every public-key-based handshake.

IIRC there was pretty strong consensus for both these decisions, but if
there is
a lot of feeling to the contrary, presumably we could revisit these.

-Ekr

-- 
> Tony Arcieri
>
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