Re: [TLS] TLS ECH, how much can the hint stick out?

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 14 September 2020 17:50 UTC

Return-Path: <rsalz@akamai.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C01253A0D9D for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 10:50:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.793
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.793 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.695, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=akamai.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sB7J77bdrZhE for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 10:50:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx0b-00190b01.pphosted.com (mx0b-00190b01.pphosted.com [IPv6:2620:100:9005:57f::1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A52E3A0A42 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 10:50:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from pps.filterd (m0122330.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-00190b01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 08EHm2lg029476; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 18:50:15 +0100
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=akamai.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : references : in-reply-to : content-type : mime-version; s=jan2016.eng; bh=Wrr+TygLzBz76QptsDCjYSl0RkhXydCjUCvmnzyXnpQ=; b=j4+8kCbryBjYvUv4ujHtNnbeThCL8fJmnM5YtX8JUVRHfhDd3nCEPShG8qi70oElYZ1Y G/tl5bvYmfqmTjAyaQbahtm8xb65NzC0dVkHxyb4Xoe1qzLtLBqGSnNQ1OFWAl1zPwvI dcK9paHDFhfEmpnMrBR3WGLUZO5R/HK8BTn6SIZRf58Mh4GjMmBu9e3jzCiGXY0XYbiv wAw4ldbGuPATWY03v/6DUdmMsg7Pm2xkwCWMR1aAhxRWEoG913vHF8K8ar2bUXFpaDeV A9/cNq2OiIZpbY65CHsZYONa+3X3p4XzrdlogV4AkEqGK/lxG3eXhkm5fw53XrRQu+53 PA==
Received: from prod-mail-ppoint1 (prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com [184.51.33.18] (may be forged)) by mx0b-00190b01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 33hepdfs64-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 14 Sep 2020 18:50:15 +0100
Received: from pps.filterd (prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com [127.0.0.1]) by prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 08EHYtrb005505; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 13:50:15 -0400
Received: from email.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.30]) by prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com with ESMTP id 33gsnxn14q-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 14 Sep 2020 13:50:14 -0400
Received: from USMA1EX-DAG1MB3.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.123.103) by usma1ex-dag1mb6.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.123.65) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1497.2; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 13:50:14 -0400
Received: from USMA1EX-DAG1MB3.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.103]) by usma1ex-dag1mb3.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.103]) with mapi id 15.00.1497.006; Mon, 14 Sep 2020 13:50:13 -0400
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Karthik Bhargavan <karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr>, Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS ECH, how much can the hint stick out?
Thread-Index: AQHWhfO3LY/7Fxe3IU+rRAfSRwB2r6ljvr2AgAAChwCAAcISAIAC78CA
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 17:50:13 +0000
Message-ID: <BEBC2C43-9014-4AD7-8E8D-20D74B29FE48@akamai.com>
References: <d33c685c-6bf3-1584-4d95-1fe2cf6695e8@huitema.net> <696D22EB-2B7C-47AB-946F-B3246709A10B@inria.fr> <CAHbrMsDq9fxH9Yvw-BozrZtF4iUU-oeOiMucJ1FBpCZurQsnNQ@mail.gmail.com> <3452C763-05CA-459C-A114-BB0163AB59EC@inria.fr>
In-Reply-To: <3452C763-05CA-459C-A114-BB0163AB59EC@inria.fr>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/16.40.20081201
x-ms-exchange-messagesentrepresentingtype: 1
x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted
x-originating-ip: [172.27.164.43]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_BEBC2C4390144AD78E8D20D74B29FE48akamaicom_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.235, 18.0.687 definitions=2020-09-14_07:2020-09-14, 2020-09-14 signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 phishscore=0 suspectscore=0 spamscore=0 adultscore=0 malwarescore=0 bulkscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2006250000 definitions=main-2009140142
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.235, 18.0.687 definitions=2020-09-14_07:2020-09-14, 2020-09-14 signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 bulkscore=0 mlxscore=0 clxscore=1011 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=962 malwarescore=0 priorityscore=1501 lowpriorityscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2006250000 definitions=main-2009140143
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/N3hhcpwIfTwTR9fvZ6zEtMOx5T0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS ECH, how much can the hint stick out?
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 17:50:20 -0000

  *   So, hiding whether a server supports ECH or not (which I called level 2) is a significantly higher bar than hiding whether a particular connection is using ECH or not (level 1).

  *   I would like to understand how the WG feels about this requirement and that there is consensus that we need (2) and not just (1).

I do not see Level 2 being a requirement.  (I don’t see how you could make it work but I’m not a cryptographer.)