Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 22 May 2017 21:21 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 06:20:18 +0900
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13
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This document has WGLC and so has a presumption of consensus. If you want to re-raise that, this is a process question which is the province of the chairs, so if you feel strongly, as it appears you do, I would encourage you raise it with them. -Ekr On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 6:02 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote: > > > On May 22, 2017, at 3:42 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > > > Well, I certainly think past the Web PKI, because one of the cases I > care about > > is WebRTC, which doesn't do any PKI validation at all. > > > > In any case, I think there are two issues: > > 1. Forbid TLS 1.3 implementations from accepting MD5 and SHA-1. > > 2. Require a specific failure if the peer presents such a certificate. > > > > There was pretty strong consensus to do #1 and I don't support removing > > it. > > The operative word here is *was*. Time has passed, and things have > changed: > > 1. The motivating problem (broad use of weak hashes in Web PKI > certificates) has become a non-problem. The CAs and the > browsers > have moved on. > > 2. We've since had many discussions that make it clearer still > that > layer violation into RFC5280 space is suboptimal. > > 3. While did not object strongly at the time, I've since seen > that the > language in question temps TLS stack authors to implement > checks against > the specific certificate algorithms at the TLS layer, instead > of at the > X509 verification layer where X509 security checks belong. > > Surely there are some old GOST signature algorithms that could appear in > certificates, > that TLS 1.3 does not prohibit, but which are not much stronger than > SHA-1, and if not > GOST then something else. Plucking out the specific code-points in > question is both > insufficient and counter-productive. > > It is time to revisit the previous consensus, because its motivation is no > longer > relevant, and its negative consequences are more apparent. > > -- > Viktor. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Sankalp Bagaria
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Nico Williams
- [TLS] Better weak hash language (was Re: AD Revie… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Better weak hash language (was Re: AD R… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Better weak hash language (was Re: AD R… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Better weak hash language (was Re: AD R… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Better weak hash language (was Re: AD R… Nico Williams
- [TLS] Standard security levels (was Re: Better we… Nico Williams