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Re: [TLS] Do we need DH?

Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Sat, 03 January 2015 20:40 UTC

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From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2015 21:39:57 +0100
In-Reply-To: <CACsn0cmD=YA4i889f--e_b-OahUVoYdKyQUaiUN--QKOmqn8uA@mail.gmail.com> (Watson Ladd's message of "Sun, 28 Dec 2014 17:38:11 -0500")
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Do we need DH?
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* Watson Ladd:

> I invite you to consider the following interesting sources
>
> http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35511.pdf
> http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35510.pdf
>
> These show that the NSA has a comparatively easy time exploiting
> static RSA.

Did you reference the correct slide decks?  These don't mention that
offline attack capabilities against RSA exist (assuming the key
material has been managed properly).

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