Re: [TLS] EU cards

Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> Thu, 28 July 2011 19:25 UTC

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From: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
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Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2011 21:25:20 +0200
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To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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Cc: "S.tefan Winter" <stefan.winter@restena.lu>, Martin Gaedke <martin.gaedke@informatik.tu-chemnitz.de>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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On 28 Jul 2011, at 21:10, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so
> why would the browser vendor bother about how it works?

This is where I disagree. It is not far from becoming the core authentication on the internet. Really really not far.  It may be surprising, but I have explained in detail here why I believe such a counterintuitive thing. More here http://webid.info and on my home page.  


> 
> Now to the cards: Since
> 1. readers is a non-standard item
> 2. all cards need different middleware
> 3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates
> 4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group
> 5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts
> this is simply put entirely uninteresting
> 
> The government cards are status projects.  We have issued
> x millions cards.  That they are only used as physical ID-cards
> is something they are slightly less open about...
> 
> Banks in Scandinavia put eID on credit-cards which means that
> every merchant get your SSN as well (if they want).
> 
> As I say all the time: Google and Apple will make all EU cards look
> like they always was: A pile of s--t.
> 
> Anders
> 
> On 2011-07-28 17:07, Henry Story wrote:
>> Hi Peter,
>> 
>> You may want to ask Prof. Martin Gaedke about this. He is working his way through the 
>> EU area on this and should have some good pointers on where these token cards are 
>> going around here. 
>> 
>>   Henry
>> 
>> On 28 Jul 2011, at 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> 
>>> Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>; writes:
>>> 
>>>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away.
>>> 
>>> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy,
>>> the Netherlands, Spain, ...?  The only place where it's really documented (in
>>> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria
>>> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in
>>> Europe doing?  There's rather little information *from third parties, not the
>>> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ...,
>>> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on.
>>> 
>>>> a) cell phone transaction numbers:
>>> 
>>> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has
>>> already shown.  It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad
>>> guys will take it.  On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to
>>> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a
>>> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what
>>> the browser sends it gets detected.
>>> 
>>> Peter.
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>> 
>> Social Web Architect
>> http://bblfish.net/
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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> 

Social Web Architect
http://bblfish.net/