[TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04.txt

Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> Fri, 19 May 2017 20:18 UTC

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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
CC: tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 20:18:03 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04.txt
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Thank you to all reviewers for their feed backs. Please find the latest version, which as far as I know includes all comments. Comments were not controversial. In order to raise next reviews I am raising aspects that might need a bit more attention.  

1)  The current document mentions I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis and I-D.ietf-tls-tls13 as normative. We can wait for these documents to become RFCs, but we can also dowref them to informational reference if we want to move that document forward. I will leave the AD to decide, and changes if needed can be done by the RFC -editor

2)  Section 4 has the following text:

"""In the case of ECDHE_PSK authentication, the PSK and pre-master are treated by distinct hash function with distinct properties.  This may introduce vulnerabilities over the expected security provided by the constructed pre-master. As such TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 should not be  used with ECDHE_PSK. """

With EDCHE_PSK being the ECDHE PSK method not restricted to the cipher suites defined in the document.  I just want to make sure we are ok with the last sentence. 


-----Original Message-----
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org] 
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 4:03 PM
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>om>; Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>om>; tls-chairs@ietf.org
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04.txt

A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by Daniel Migault and posted to the IETF repository.

Name:		draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
Revision:	04
Title:		ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Document date:	2017-05-18
Group:		tls
Pages:		8
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04

   This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The cipher suites are all based on
   the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
   (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
   with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK
   provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides forward
   secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and integrity


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