[TLS] OpenSSL 0.9.8l diffs for draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-03
Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Mon, 07 December 2009 23:15 UTC
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Subject: [TLS] OpenSSL 0.9.8l diffs for draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-03
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Dear TLS, Here is an implementation of draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-03: ftp://ftp.sap.com/pub/ietf-work/tls/ ftp://ftp.sap.com/pub/ietf-work/tls/OpenSSL-0.9.8l-draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-03-20091207.diff ftp://ftp.sap.com/pub/ietf-work/tls/OpenSSL-0.9.8l-draft-mrex-tls-secure-renegotiation-03-20091207.zip It is a diff to OpenSSL-0.9.8l. It should work for SSLv2-BC ClientHello, SSLv3 and TLS Implementation notes: - it includes fallback for OpenSSL when compiled without TLS Extensions - It appears to work for DTLS as well, but I admit to have not yet understood how that works exactly. - for enabling renegotiation with old peers, I copied SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION from newer snapshot and removed that bit from SSL_OP_ALL since all OP-Bits are gone, the app must provide different OP-values for Server and Client SSL_CTX in order to distinguish client/server I'm having slight troubles with OpenSSL's "s_client" and "s_server" applications. It appears that there is insufficient return-code chechking for the SSL_renegotiate() calls in several places of OpenSSL. - SSL_renegotiate() might need to reset "new_session" when the called renegotiation method fails (rc=0) - both s_server and s_client call SSL_renegotiate(), but do _not_ check the return codes and write confusing/incorrect messages to the screen (in particular for 0.9.8l where renegotiation has been disabled by default). - Since SSL_do_handshake() seems to always return "1", independent of whether renegotiation is performed or the request rejected, the output of "SSL_do_handshake()=1 by s_server is confusing. -Martin