Re: [TLS] Chatter on consensus

Martin Rex <> Thu, 28 January 2010 00:54 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <>
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To: (Kemp David P.)
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2010 01:54:37 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <> from "Kemp, David P." at Jan 27, 10 06:06:58 pm
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Chatter on consensus
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Kemp, David P. wrote:
> For secure renegotiation, if you eliminate the MUST NOT in section 3.5,
> then you must add a configuration somewhere (either hard coded or as a
> configuration option) that determines how the software will behave.

I'm sorry, I completely lost you.

Removing that MUST NOT simplifies the architecture, the protocol
and the implementations.  Guaranteed.  You will find out when
you implement this.

Discussing this at the theory level is much more difficult,
and likely the reason why there is so much discussion and

I know that pretty well.  I completely foobared the implementation
guidance in the initial version (-00) of my draft, because I hadn't
sufficiently thought about implementing it.

It is possible to do it at the theoretical level, though.
That's what I did with the -03 document when I implemented
it exactly according to my own spec in OpenSSL-0.9.8l.

> For insecure renegotiation, backwards interop scenarios can be supported
> non-disruptively in 3 different ways in accordance with -03, but they
> can also be supported non-disruptively in a 4th way, by following the
> RFCs for TLSv1.0-v1.2 and ignoring -03.
I'm sorry, I can not follow.

Insecure renegotiation is what happens, if you do not abort renegotiation
in the consistent absence of secure renegotiation.

I do not understand what you are refering to with "in three different ways".

There are a number of constraints that need to be checked, and it
is up to the implementer whether he implements each check individually
with its own error handling and own error number, or wether he
combines certain conditionals, error handling and error codes.

The MUST NOTs and the NOT RECOMMENDEDs I'm objecting to are
completely invisible at both, the API level and in the policy configuration
that determines which kind of interoperability should be allowed.