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Date: Wed, 05 May 2021 12:52:52 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/OHTt9HnhoPMlXM7ty-92wI_3DDc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call for draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc: redux
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What Russ said here is important.  However, I don't see any reason that =
this record should not be protected.

I also think that we can use a content type outside of the scarce range =
we have for TLS record content types.  This only makes sense for use wit=
h DTLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 with connection IDs, so we can rely on the conte=
nt type being encrypted.  That means multiplexing constraints don't appl=
y (they probably wouldn't anyway as this makes no sense for use with ICE=
).

Finally, I think that the flexible size of the cookie is not necessary. =
 Pick a fixed size.  Unlike the handshake cookie, there is no reason for=
 this to be stateless.  (I also wouldn't call it a cookie.)

The comments that Martin Duke currently has on the connection ID regardi=
ng path validation rules apply more fully here than they do on that draf=
t.  Perhaps we could fix them here.

On Wed, May 5, 2021, at 04:12, Russ Housley wrote:
> This document seems fine to me, but the first paragraph of Section 3=20=

> needs some work.  This can be sorted out after adoption.
>=20
> Section 3 begins with:
>=20
>    When a record with CID is received that has the source address of t=
he
>    enclosing UDP datagram different from the one previously associated=

>    with that CID, the receiver MUST NOT update its view of the peer's =
IP
>    address and port number with the source specified in the UDP datagr=
am
>    before cryptographically validating the enclosed record(s) but
>    instead perform a return routability check.
>=20
> I agree that the return routability check should be performed before=20=

> updating the peer's IP address and port number, but I the part about=20=

> "before cryptographically validating the enclosed record" seems to ope=
n=20
> up some opportunities for trouble.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
> > On May 3, 2021, at 11:44 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > Hi!
> >=20
> > We would like to re-run the WG adoption call for "Return Routability=
 Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3=E2=80=9D. Please state whether you supp=
ort adoption of this draft as a WG item by posting a message to the TLS =
list by 2359 UTC 24 May 2021.  Please include any additional information=
 that is helpful in understanding your position.
> >=20
> > NOTES:
> >=20
> > 1) We are re-running this WG adoption now that DTLS 1.3 [1] and Conn=
ection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2 [2] is done.
> > 2) Here is a link to the original WG adoption call [3].
> >=20
> > Thanks,
> > Chris, Joe, and Sean
> >=20
> > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/
> > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-=
id/
> > [3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/IJYqpTmSHsCkiMaUPt_Alt=
vKbe8/
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

