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Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 05 April 2018 09:03 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 05:02:59 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
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On Wed, 4 Apr 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> HPKP had a TTL and yet as a practical matter, people found it very problematic.
> And, of course, if you're concerned with hijacking attacks, the hijacker will
> just advertise a very long TTL.

By publising DANE records with either a TLSA record or a denial of
existence proof, you can override any longterm TTL.

If an attacker puts in a 1 year PIN/TTL, any TLS-dnssec extension
containing a valid NSEC proof of non-existence overrides the previous
TTL/PIN.

In fact, this is one of the reasons the WG should decide to fix the
current draft to include proofs of denial of existence.

Paul

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