Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3]

Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk> Wed, 09 April 2014 12:44 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2014 14:44:28 +0200
From: Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3]
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Are you refering to Java TLS clients in section 1. Introduction ?

" Some  widely-distributed TLS clients are not capable of DH groups
where p >  1024. "

This limitation has been fixed in Java 8

http://bugs.java.com/bugdatabase/view_bug.do?bug_id=7044060
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6851461/java-why-does-ssl-handshake-give-could-not-generate-dh-keypair-exception

Fedor


On 08.04.2014 07:41, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Fri 2014-03-28 21:33:39 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>> I've submitted an initial stab at a proposal for negotiated discrete log
>> diffie-hellman ciphersuites:
>>
>>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gillmor-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe-00
> Thanks to feedback from Watson Ladd and Samuel Neves over on the CFRG,
> i've updated the named groups in the above draft.
>
> I've also done another pass over the text:
>
>   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gillmor-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe-01
>
> Comments, questions and critiques welcome.
>
>     --dkg
>
>
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