Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (was Re: Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?)
Bryan Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com> Wed, 02 December 2015 09:11 UTC
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From: Bryan Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 02 Dec 2015 10:11:19 +0100
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To: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (was Re: Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?)
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On 02 Dec 2015, at 09:42, Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 12:45 AM, Bryan A Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com <mailto:brynosaurus@gmail.com>> wrote: > On 12/1/15 9:49 PM, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote: > > Dear Bryan, > > > > DTLS: > > > > Now there's still the important question of whether this (new) proposal > > could be made to work in the context of DTLS. For the DTLS case, my > > current thinking is that some elements of my earlier proposal is > > probably more suitable: namely using a stream cipher (or AEAD used as a > > stream cipher) to encrypt and recognize the explicitly-transmitted > > sequence numbers that DTLS needs. This could operate basically the same > > as I described in my earlier E-mail on this topic. Note that the length > > field is no longer a problem in DTLS as it is in TLS, because the > > receiver already gets the length of the datagram from UDP. > > > > > > Do I understand correctly that your propose makes difficult to derive > > the key from the original value depending on the sequence number? > > I'm not sure I understand your question; can you clarify? What is the > "original value" you are worried about the key being derivable from? > Certainly if the cipher (stream cipher or AEAD) is working correctly, it > should make it cryptographically infeasible for an attacker to derive > the shared secret key from anything the protocol transmits. > > I mean something like http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4357#section-7 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4357#section-7> > We have the keys calculated during the handshake and want to modify it for each record. Hmmm - the RFC you point to is about the GOST cipher, and section 7 seems to be about “secret key diversification”, but I know nothing about GOST other than that it’s a cipher and it’s not obvious to me what exactly “secret key diversification” means here or what exactly it has to do with TLS (which works with many different ciphers). I guess I still need a more detailed clarification of your question if I’m going to be able to try to answer it. B > > > -- > SY, Dmitry Belyavsky
- [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TL… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bill Cox
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Short, Todd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jim Schaad
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… GUBALLA, JENS (JENS)
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Mike Copley
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Mill
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Valery Smyslov
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… GUBALLA, JENS (JENS)
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Valery Smyslov
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jeff Burdges
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum