[TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt

Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 04 November 2024 14:06 UTC

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From: Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Peter C <Peter.C=40ncsc.gov.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2024 15:05:57 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
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On Monday, 4 November 2024 14:39:12 CET, Peter C wrote:
> Tirumal Reddy wrote:
>> SLH-DSA is not proposed for the end-entity certificates, it is preferred
>> for CA certificates (please see the 3rd paragraph in
>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html#section-2) 
>  
> Yes, except the introduction says:
>  
>   “This memo specifies how SLH-DSA can be negotiated for authentication
>   in TLS 1.3 via the ‘signature_algorithms’ and  ‘signature_algorithms_cert’
>   extensions.”
>  
> which certainly implies end-entity certificates with SLH-DSA public keys.
>  
> I realise that a single SignatureScheme registry is used for 
> both extensions, so
> if you are not proposing SLH-DSA end-entity certificates then you need to be
> more explicit that it is not recommended for use in signature_algorithms.

I think that's more of an argument for marking it as "Recommended = N"
in the registry than outright forbidding it in CertificateVerify.

Yes, it's totally overkill for signing TLS messages, and normal Internet
clients and servers should not use it, but I think forbidding it for
signature_algorithms and not signature_algorithms_cert will just complicate
implementations unnecessairly.
  
> Peter
>  
> From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> 
> Sent: 04 November 2024 07:16
> To: Peter C <Peter.C@ncsc.gov.uk>
> Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for 
> draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
>  
> Hi Peter,
>  
> Please see inline 
>  
> On Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 22:17, Peter C <Peter.C@ncsc.gov.uk> wrote:
> Tiru,
>  
> Is SLH-DSA considered a practical option for TLS end-entity certificates?
>  
> Under realistic network conditions, TLS handshakes with full 
> SLH-DSA certificate chains seem to be about 5-10 times slower 
> than traditional certificate chains and, in some cases, can take 
> on the order of seconds.  See, for example, the results in 
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/071, 
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1447, 
> https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1728103 and 
> https://thomwiggers.nl/post/tls-measurements/.
>  
> I agree that there’s an argument for using SLH-DSA in root 
> certificates, but I’m surprised it’s being proposed for the full 
> chain.
>  
> SLH-DSA is not proposed for the end-entity certificates, it is 
> preferred for CA certificates (please see the 3rd paragraph 
> in https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html#section-2) 
>  
> -Tiru
>  
>  
> Peter 
>  
> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> 
> Sent: 03 November 2024 11:13
> To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
> Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for 
> draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
>  
> Thanks for doing this work.  I hope the TLS WG will promptly adopt it.
>  
> Russ
>  
>
> On Nov 2, 2024, at 8:15 PM, tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
>  
> Hi all,
>
> This draft 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa/ 
> specifies how the PQC signature scheme SLH-DSA can be used for 
> authentication in TLS 1.3.
> Comments and suggestions are welcome.
>
> Regards, 
> -Tiru
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 05:39
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
> To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <kondtir@gmail.com>, John Gray 
> <john.gray@entrust.com>, Scott Fluhrer <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, 
> Timothy Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>
>
>
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt has been
> successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:     draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa
> Revision: 00
> Title:    Use of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3
> Date:     2024-11-02
> Group:    Individual Submission
> Pages:    8
> URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
> Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa/
> HTML:     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html
> HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This memo specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme SLH-DSA
>    [FIPS205] is used for authentication in TLS 1.3.
>  

-- 
Regards,
Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic