[TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 04 November 2024 14:06 UTC
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From: Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Peter C <Peter.C=40ncsc.gov.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2024 15:05:57 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt
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On Monday, 4 November 2024 14:39:12 CET, Peter C wrote: > Tirumal Reddy wrote: >> SLH-DSA is not proposed for the end-entity certificates, it is preferred >> for CA certificates (please see the 3rd paragraph in >> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html#section-2) > > Yes, except the introduction says: > > “This memo specifies how SLH-DSA can be negotiated for authentication > in TLS 1.3 via the ‘signature_algorithms’ and ‘signature_algorithms_cert’ > extensions.” > > which certainly implies end-entity certificates with SLH-DSA public keys. > > I realise that a single SignatureScheme registry is used for > both extensions, so > if you are not proposing SLH-DSA end-entity certificates then you need to be > more explicit that it is not recommended for use in signature_algorithms. I think that's more of an argument for marking it as "Recommended = N" in the registry than outright forbidding it in CertificateVerify. Yes, it's totally overkill for signing TLS messages, and normal Internet clients and servers should not use it, but I think forbidding it for signature_algorithms and not signature_algorithms_cert will just complicate implementations unnecessairly. > Peter > > From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> > Sent: 04 November 2024 07:16 > To: Peter C <Peter.C@ncsc.gov.uk> > Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for > draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt > > Hi Peter, > > Please see inline > > On Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 22:17, Peter C <Peter.C@ncsc.gov.uk> wrote: > Tiru, > > Is SLH-DSA considered a practical option for TLS end-entity certificates? > > Under realistic network conditions, TLS handshakes with full > SLH-DSA certificate chains seem to be about 5-10 times slower > than traditional certificate chains and, in some cases, can take > on the order of seconds. See, for example, the results in > https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/071, > https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1447, > https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1728103 and > https://thomwiggers.nl/post/tls-measurements/. > > I agree that there’s an argument for using SLH-DSA in root > certificates, but I’m surprised it’s being proposed for the full > chain. > > SLH-DSA is not proposed for the end-entity certificates, it is > preferred for CA certificates (please see the 3rd paragraph > in https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html#section-2) > > -Tiru > > > Peter > > From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> > Sent: 03 November 2024 11:13 > To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> > Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org> > Subject: [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for > draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt > > Thanks for doing this work. I hope the TLS WG will promptly adopt it. > > Russ > > > On Nov 2, 2024, at 8:15 PM, tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi all, > > This draft > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa/ > specifies how the PQC signature scheme SLH-DSA can be used for > authentication in TLS 1.3. > Comments and suggestions are welcome. > > Regards, > -Tiru > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org> > Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 05:39 > Subject: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt > To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <kondtir@gmail.com>, John Gray > <john.gray@entrust.com>, Scott Fluhrer <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, > Timothy Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com> > > > A new version of Internet-Draft draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt has been > successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the > IETF repository. > > Name: draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa > Revision: 00 > Title: Use of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3 > Date: 2024-11-02 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 8 > URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa/ > HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa-00.html > HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tls-reddy-slhdsa > > Abstract: > > This memo specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme SLH-DSA > [FIPS205] is used for authentication in TLS 1.3. > -- Regards, Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic
- [TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: New Version Notification for … Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-tls… tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Peter C
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Peter C
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Peter C
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Kampanakis, Panos
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… D. J. Bernstein
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Bas Westerbaan
- [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Russ Housley
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: New Version Notification for draft-tls-… Peter C