Re: [TLS] tls 1.3: renegotiation

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 28 July 2014 21:02 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 14:02:03 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] tls 1.3: renegotiation
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On 28 July 2014 13:11, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> wrote:
> It looks like one would need to deploy  both TLS1.3 and HTTP/2 at the same time. Once TLS 1.3 and HTTP/2 are deployed, the way a site implements TLS client auth will depend on the combination of TLS version and HTTP version negotiated:
> TLS1.3 + HTTP/2 -> New-style TLS client auth (TBD).
> TLS1.3 + HTTP/1.1 -> No way to support TLS client auth?
> TLS1.2 + HTTP/2 -> No way to support TLS client auth?
> TLS1.2 + HTTP/1.1 -> TLS client auth via renegotiation.

Client authentication is still possible, it just has to come in the
opening handshake.  Your concern is spontaneous client authentication.

HTTP/2 forbids renegotiation entirely, but permits it before HTTP/2
starts (to allow for client certificate confidentiality, if that is
desired).

That means that for HTTP/2 at least, the need isn't there.  They are
already looking for alternatives.

And it's not that alternatives don't exist, it's more the case that we
disagree on the viability aspects, I think.