[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2025-11-26)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 24 November 2025 15:36 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 07:35:57 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2025-11-26)
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On Mon, Nov 24, 2025 at 7:14 AM Simon Josefsson <simon=
40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> We are having trouble getting safe hybrid PQ solutions published.  Until
> we have a couple of widely deployed hybrid PQ KEMs published,
> implemented and deployed, I don't think we should fragment the already
> thin resources we have to reach that goal by spending further cycles on,
> and then publish a fragile solutions like this.  Please prioritize a
> non-NIST/MLKEM hybrid PQ KEM for TLS.  FrodoKEM?  Streamlined NTRU
> Prime?  We need more hybrid PQ options.
>

Why? The general deployed pattern in TLS is to have a small number of
dominant algorithms and we already have X25519+MLKEM widely deployed.
Given that any particular connection can only be protected with a single
algorithm, it's not clear to me how the world is improved by having multiple
algorithms with roughly the same performance properties.

I could see some argument for having some algorithm with significantly
different performance/security tradeoff (though as I understand it there are
some practical challenges to adding Classic McEliece), but that doesn't
seem to be what you're suggesting here.

More generally I am opposed to the IETF publishing any algorithm
specification
for TLS which has not been externally vetted. That could mean standardized
elsewhere or sign-off by CFRG, but the TLS WG should not just be picking
up algorithms without external review and adding them to TLS.

-Ekr