Re: [TLS] [certid] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance

ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net> Thu, 25 March 2010 20:25 UTC

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Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2010 23:24:00 +0300
From: ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <20100325202400.GA27515@eltex.net>
References: <4BAA7F31.5050706@KingsMountain.com> <20100325041402.GA6222@eltex.net> <4BABA01E.7080808@extendedsubset.com> <4BABBA93.40207@fifthhorseman.net>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org, =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [certid] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance
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That's what cross-certification and multiple path validation is for.
Browsers do not support it directly but i wrote a validating mitm proxy
which address this problem among with others.

On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 03:33:39PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> 
> Running your own X.509 CA works if your goal is only
> intra-organizational communication.  As soon as you want to federate
> communication with external organizations, running your own CA is
> insufficient with X.509, because the model only allows a single
> certifier per certificate.