Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> Wed, 06 July 2016 17:24 UTC
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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2016 09:23:41 -0800
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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I don't think we ever call consensus on this topic. It looks like there is rough consensus to move forward with RSA-PSS as the MUST implement algorithm for certificate verify in TLS 1.3 and not allow PKCS-1.5. During the discussion it also seemed that it is realistic that we may want to add additional types in the future. We may want better separation of signature types of certificates and certificate verify. Cheers, J&S On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 2:05 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote: > On Tuesday 08 March 2016 18:41:32 Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 08, 2016 at 07:24:37PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote: > > > No, I said that we have no reason to believe that quantum computers > > > won't follow exponential increase in number of qbits they can > > > handle, > > > with the highest increase not exceeding doubling every year, but > > > more > > > likely doubling every two years (as every other technological > > > development did till now). > > > > There's reason to be skeptical of such analogies. Moore's law was > > neither a theorem nor a law of nature. It was an observation about > > progress in feature-size shrink of silicon transistors. It is far > > from clear that evolution of silicon fabrication is a relevant model. > > That's why I'm not saying that it will be exactly like Moore's law. > > My point is, that processes which have super-exponential growth are the > exception, not the rule (if they exist at all). And you would be hard > pressed to find any process in history that experienced exponential > growth over a long time span and be at the same time vastly faster than > the Moore's law. > -- > Regards, > Hubert Kario > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team > Web: www.cz.redhat.com > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hannes Mehnert
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is enou… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri