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Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-01.txt

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 11 December 2017 23:49 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 17:49:05 -0600
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To: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-01.txt
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Certificates are pretty wasteful, outside of the keys themselves.
There has to be some significant gains to be had.  I think that we
have discussed generating a dictionary that would be useful for
certificates, so if we do that we won't know the full answer yet (I
see no mention of that in the draft, so I guess that I might be in
dreamland).

On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 2:43 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> wrote:
> The discussion of this draft makes it sound like implementations will have
> additional complexity to support certificate compression. Complexity adds
> security risks, so just how much benefit does certificate compression
> provide? My naive thinking is that most of the data in certificates is
> signatures, which shouldn't be very compressible.
>
> Of course, for small systems, even a small improvement may be important.
>
> Cheers - Bill
>
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