Re: [TLS] One approach to rollback protection

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <> Tue, 27 September 2011 07:04 UTC

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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 09:07:54 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] One approach to rollback protection
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On 09/27/2011 01:44 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I've been doing some thinking about how to prevent rollback to
> TLS 1.0/SSLv3 from TLS 1.1-capable agents.
> Since there's very little deployment of TLS 1.1+, basically anything
> we do now will roll out more or less in parallel with TLS 1.1 deployment,
> as long as it's backward compatible.The obvious technique here is to
> stuff the relevant indicator in the cipher suites list, since we know that
> servers ignore unknown entries there.

How about servers that fail on unknown ciphersuites? (they used to 
exist). If such a thing is proposed there will be no incentive at all to 
fix the broken servers. I see Bill Frantz solution as a pragmatic one 
that does not break the protocol (a hack over hack makes the protocol so 
complicated that in a few years we'll need a clean slate redesign of 
TLS. Complexity adds security issues rarely solves them.).