Re: [TLS] extending the un-authenticated DTLS header

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Tue, 15 November 2016 09:18 UTC

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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 10:11:37 +0100
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] extending the un-authenticated DTLS header
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On Tue, 2016-11-15 at 18:10 +0900, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 15 November 2016 at 17:34, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB)
> <thomas.fossati@nokia.com> wrote:
> > 
> > The draft proposes two ways to allocate the identifier (see 3rd
> > para of
> > https://thomas-fossati.github.io/draft-tls-cid/#rfc.section.1):
> > 1. Server decides unilaterally a value that is fixed for the
> > duration of
> > the session (SecAssocType.fixed);
> > 2. Server and Client agree on a sequence of values generated using
> > HOTP
> > [RFC 4226] seeded by the session shared secret (SecAssocType.hotp);
> > Client
> > shifts to the next value when needed (e.g. on transport handover).
> > 
> > 
> > At first this might not look particularly elegant, but there are
> > good
> > reasons for having both methods.
> 
> I'm not seeing quite enough information here to implement this.  How
> does a server know which of the many HOTP keys it has are in use?
> Surely you can't use the same HOTP key with every client.

Not sure I understand the question, but I'd suggest to read the text on
generating the hotp keys.

regards,
Nikos