Re: [TLS] MD5 diediedie (was Re: Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms)

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 07:46 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:45:50 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] MD5 diediedie (was Re: Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms)
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On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>;
wrote:

> > No MD5 function should remain in the relevant codebase;
>
> In particular the IETF does not get to tell anyone which functions
> they get to include in their codebase.  So no IETF document saying
> such a thing makes much difference.


Not being the person who called "diediedie", but being in total agreement
with the OP, "diediedie" should represent a "burn notice" from the IETF to
all implementers:

DO NOT DO THIS!!!

Clearly many TLS stacks still implement MD5, and there are no TLS police to
arrest the people who are ignoring the IETF RFCs and still shipping
diediedie-filled crypto, but if we want any modicum of security want any
sort of security guarantees from TLS, all stacks *MUST* abandon MD5 in its
entirety.

-- 
Tony Arcieri