Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-00.txt

Hi Peter,

Yes, it should end with ...SHA384. We will fix this in the next update.
(Related question from Martin Thompson can be found in [0])

Cheers,
John

[0] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg21517.html

On 10/07/16 12:51, "TLS on behalf of Peter Dettman" <tls-bounces@ietf.org
on behalf of peter.dettman@bouncycastle.org> wrote:

>Hi,
>I've just implemented these ciphersuites in BouncyCastle TLS, and have a
>couple of questions:
>
>In Section 3., should
>
>   TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
>
>end with ...SHA384 instead?
>
>   For the AES-256 cipher suites, the TLS PRF with SHA-384 as the hash
>   function SHALL be used and Clients and Servers MUST NOT negotiate
>   curves of less than 384 bits.
>
>requires SHA384 as the PRF, and I don't know what else SHA256 could
>refer to for an AEAD ciphersuite.
>
>I'm also curious whether there is a precedent in other RFCs for an
>explicit minimum curve bits, or perhaps a de facto implementer's rule?
>
>Regards,
>Pete Dettman
>
>On 28/05/2016 12:19 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>> 
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>>directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security of the IETF.
>> 
>>         Title           : ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher
>>Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>>         Authors         : John Mattsson
>>                           Daniel Migault
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-00.txt
>> 	Pages           : 7
>> 	Date            : 2016-05-27
>> 
>> Abstract:
>>    This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
>>    Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The cipher suites are all based on
>>    the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
>>    (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
>>    with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK
>>    provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
>>    forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
>>    integrity protection.
>> 
>> 
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
>> 
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-00
>> 
>> 
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>> 
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>> 
>
>_______________________________________________
>TLS mailing list
>TLS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls