Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Mon, 28 July 2014 14:54 UTC
Return-Path: <colm@allcosts.net>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F11151B285A for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.678
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.678 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3mdFre2rLPqk for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-oa0-f41.google.com (mail-oa0-f41.google.com [209.85.219.41]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5211F1B2858 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-oa0-f41.google.com with SMTP id j17so8945055oag.0 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=emICU7JudqDgCAleBTeWAnCoXjAYnQ2Kr1888GbhLQM=; b=mSl+xn0jrS1hXFzg98Vcrbw7IFRKNDSxK5ocR1tDQPAUEUGp7bFN/S6kvS2XkfxK2u zrIC3OofKfd4CovuyK5KMi3jTRF2a+FFUEY4icefe+T3CxVhNPtQUDAt6FFjGBBDtQ4U P6tZwEs5lpI6LHWe0XTHXcOEwuJy+R3evtu5AmPK1E97iPVAqY1MmjqyIk6cpwbracna Iu8vRo8MegagNXuQYxBzx23htifWZFbzduGfugIwLud12q4m6au02MQ0gyqrBlsE7F5u 9zstMo/yXjIrTWLq+RYC7LCVG3nQqq+vdzvsQNmFzdGuht2Yh9gNTbZEnV7rCR65GFyo Kr3w==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnUWViz58vXpimKCPCWvnDipAmeJ7objAO3icXHCqV20cjHXjh5BjGUnf+ZwJgWUw5HG56z
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.60.62.234 with SMTP id b10mr6451786oes.3.1406559240667; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.76.10.198 with HTTP; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:00 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <1406537753.2413.12.camel@dhcp-2-127.brq.redhat.com>
References: <DD255E31-FA87-40CE-AF13-0F43A7DD54CF@cisco.com> <CACsn0cnt-ry182AjOyTTZGteifs7VyRPYHaj-xDCBOf0D53w9A@mail.gmail.com> <CAAF6GDfK7awipoMT_PPyKnTe-fF1=KY1Be8kUMSYrXN0Wzb=tg@mail.gmail.com> <1406537753.2413.12.camel@dhcp-2-127.brq.redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:54:00 -0700
Message-ID: <CAAF6GDcKqymNMnVa50Q7kSTgHrWcM1-qMNGyxU-NcjXMnCD3gQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/P28iIFbv33_0_hEzM5QWxBWZgJw
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 14:54:02 -0000
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> wrote: > Are there any pointers to these attacks? Will these attacks be countered > with such a change? I believe not as alert messages consist of only two > bytes and will be distinct from any other higher protocol messages > transferred by the TLS record protocol. This is not the case. Firstly, even with a stream cipher it doesn't distinguish the message from a 2 byte application data message. But most ciphers are block ciphers, and so the true length is fuzzed by about an order of magnitude. -- Colm
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti