Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility
Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> Fri, 14 September 2007 22:50 UTC
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Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2007 15:50:22 -0700
From: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility
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>>> I think the solution we need is to specifically list each supported >>> signature algorithm, e.g. >>> >>> enum { >>> rsa_with_md5(0), rsa_with_sha1(1), >>> rsa_with_sha256(2), rsa_with_sha384(3), >>> rsa_with_sha512(4), dsa_with_sha1(5), >>> (65535) >>> }; >> >> And then we could change Signature structure to >> >> struct { >> SignatureAlgorithm signature_algorithm; >> opaque signature_value<0..2^16-1>; >> } Signature; >> >> Eric, what's your opinion? > > OK, I started trying to wire this into TLS and it's messy. > There are three contexts we have to think about: > > - Certs (from either side) > - CertificateVerify > - ServerKeyExchange > > The difficulty is that the latter two already have signals indicating > what acceptable signature algorithms are, in the ClientCertificateType, > and the ciphersuite respectively. So, we either need to significantly > reconstruct those or have duplication of information, with the > result that you have to potentially deal with mismatched information, > e.g., only offering RSA in the SKE, but offering RSA and DSA in the > new value. I think this information is disjoint. For example, you can have a DSA key in a certificate that is signed by RSA/SHA-1. Mike _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Bodo Moeller
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Mike
- [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Mike
- Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Axel.Heider
- Re: Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 interoperating Mike
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Mike
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Russ Housley
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen
- RE: [TLS] TLS 1.2 hash agility Pasi.Eronen