Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*

Eftychios Theodorakis <eftychios.theodorakis@gmail.com> Fri, 18 November 2016 21:36 UTC

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From: Eftychios Theodorakis <eftychios.theodorakis@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2016 13:36:05 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*
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It is imprinted in people's mind that minor version numbering = small
improvements and compatibility. People for better or worse see a minor
version as minor improvements and often disregard them considering the
effort versus the payout - even if that is a single configuration change.
That's how they learned from non security related projects.

> I prefer TLS 1.3, because is signals continuity with the
> ongoing TLS deployment efforts.

The alternative suggestion (4) also signals the ongoing efforts. True it
does hint on possible incompatibility; but is this not an honest versioning
then?

I think educating people is a good cause, but that's not enough. One has to
account for all the real life anecdotes mentioned above. If people were
good and fully informed decision makers there would not be a need for "do
not press this red button" signs.

I am not sure what will end up being the better version, but I am certain
that 1.3 will be disregarded as a minor change - it is not. My suggestion
is for TLS 4.


2016-11-18 10:07 GMT-08:00 D. J. Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>;:

> The largest number of users have the least amount of information, and
> they see version numbers as part of various user interfaces. It's clear
> how they will be inclined to guess 3>1.3>1.2>1.1>1.0 (very bad) but
> 4>3>1.2>1.1>1.0 (eliminating the problem as soon as 4 is supported).
>
> We've all heard anecdotes of 3>1.2>1.1>1.0 disasters. Even if this type
> of disaster happens to only 1% of site administrators, it strikes me as
> more important for security than any of the arguments that have been
> given for "TLS 1.3". So I would prefer "TLS 4".
>
> Yes, sure, we can try to educate people that TLS>SSL (but then we're
> fighting against tons of TLS=SSL messaging), or educate them to use
> server-testing tools (so that they can fix the problem afterwards---but
> I wonder whether anyone has analyzed the damage caused by running SSLv3
> for a little while before switching the same keys to a newer protocol),
> and hope that this education fights against 3>1.3 more effectively than
> it fought against 3>1.2. But it's better to switch to a less error-prone
> interface that doesn't require additional education in the first place.
>
> ---Dan
>
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