Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3

Benjamin Beurdouche <benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr> Mon, 29 February 2016 18:11 UTC

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From: Benjamin Beurdouche <benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr>
Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 19:10:54 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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> PKCS #1 1.5 is a real problem. The last PKCS #1 1.5 signature related
> vuln that could've been prevented by using RSA-PSS was found 2 months
> ago [1]. The last one in a major implementation (BERserk) was in 2014.
> 
> tl;dr: I don't think supporting PKCS #1 1.5 in TLS 1.3 is reasonable.
> Let's not repeat the mistakes from the past.

I agree, we started 1.3 by removing old and deprecated stuff. We should not allow it now and risk weakening our work...

B.