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Re: [TLS] AES-CCM ECC Cipher Suites for TLS @ IETF 78

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> Tue, 20 July 2010 21:15 UTC

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Sender: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <n.mavrogiannopoulos@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2010 23:15:36 +0200
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
References: <C9990CC0-A4D7-4519-9DEA-E415F11EBCEB@cisco.com> <001b01cb253a$242ad9b0$6c808d10$@briansmith.org> <43895D94-BB8B-4151-8E4E-C7148B35D361@cisco.com> <004b01cb276a$ac2a2190$047e64b0$@briansmith.org> <152DF6E4-BC01-453B-BCE4-0324F9B97D81@cisco.com>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] AES-CCM ECC Cipher Suites for TLS @ IETF 78
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David McGrew wrote:

>> And, IMO, every implementation should
>> support the un-truncated form, so it should be impossible for the
>> client to
>> offer the truncated forms without also offering the un-truncated form.
>> Specifying the truncation in an extension that the server is free to
>> ignore
>> would provide for that.
> 
> I respectfully disagree.  Users of low-power radio devices have already
> decided that it is acceptable to use 8 octets or fewer for
> authentication, and IMO TLS should accept and incorporate that policy.  
> (802.15.4 link crypto allows zero to 8 octets of authentication strength.)

Different fields of technology have different needs. Could you elaborate
 on why TLS should accept and incorporate the policy for low-power radio
devices? Will low-power radio devices use TLS to communicate?


regards,
Nikos

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