Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in browsers

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Thu, 28 July 2011 14:45 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: stefan.winter@restena.lu, tls@ietf.org
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Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2011 02:45:11 +1200
Subject: Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in browsers
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Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>; writes:

>Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away.

Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, ...?  The only place where it's really documented (in
quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria
and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in
Europe doing?  There's rather little information *from third parties, not the
vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ...,
the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on.

>a) cell phone transaction numbers:

The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has
already shown.  It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad
guys will take it.  On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to
verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a
cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what
the browser sends it gets detected.

Peter.