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Re: [TLS] Draft updates: tls-dnssec-chain

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sat, 28 April 2018 17:52 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Sat, 28 Apr 2018 13:52:05 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft updates: tls-dnssec-chain
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> On Apr 28, 2018, at 12:19 PM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>    This specification can also be used to optionally convey
>    authenticated denial of existence of TLSA records.  Restrictive uses
>    that might require such proofs (such as the PKIX constraining modes
>    of DANE, or where DANE should always be preferred over other modes of
>    authentication such as traditional PKIX) are thus not in its intended
>    scope.  Such restrictive uses can however be supported
>    opportunistically.

The last sentence makes no sense.  The term "Restrictive uses" is poorly
defined.  The reduction in scope is effectively a reduction to just the
cases where the extension is mandatory, if that's what you intend to do
then say so (expect pushback).

Please do not imply that any non-mandatory "additive" use-cases are
viable.  They are not.

-- 
	Viktor.

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