Re: [TLS] [saag] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 06 October 2010 21:17 UTC

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Date: Wed, 06 Oct 2010 23:17:47 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>, saag@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [saag] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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People keep referring to the 100+ vendor CA jungle. It is somewhat 
impolite to point it out, but there are very few major vendors in this 
space, and these vendors have been implicated in some of the most 
publicized attacks. In some cases, hiding behind a "low-cost" brand name.

In other words, the problem with the TLS PKI is not (only) the small fish.

Thanks,
	Yaron

On 10/05/2010 02:46 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
[...]
>
> Conceptually, limiting the certificates that can be used to provide
> servers on specific DNS hostnames to certificates explicitly listed
> by the DNS admin would significantly reduce the huge attack surface
> of the existing "TLS PKI" with>100 independent pre-configured
> trust-anchors in most TLS client software.
>