Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8448 (5720)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sun, 05 May 2019 23:12 UTC

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Date: Sun, 5 May 2019 18:12:12 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: martin.thomson@gmail.com, rdd@cert.org, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, mt@lowentropy.net, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8448 (5720)
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I guess we want Hold For Document Update?

-Ben

On Sun, May 05, 2019 at 03:36:20PM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8448,
> "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5720
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>;
> 
> Section: GLOBAL
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> 00 0d 00 20 00 1e 04 03 05 03 06 03 02 03 08 04 08 05
> 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01 02 01 04 02 05 02 06 02 02 02 
> 
> 
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> 00 0d 00 18 00 16 04 03 05 03 06 03 02 03 08 04 08 05
> 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01 02 01
> 
> Notes
> -----
> The traces all show DSA signature schemes in ClientHello messages.  The use of these is prohibited by RFC 8446.  To be compliant, these would be removed.
> 
> Note that this isn't a simple substitution as implied above.  The length fields on all of the messages would also need to be reduced by 8 in addition to making the substitution.  The value of the PSK binders used in the resumption case in Section 4 would need to be recalculated also.
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8448 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-07)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3
> Publication Date    : January 2019
> Author(s)           : M. Thomson
> Category            : INFORMATIONAL
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG